UNITED STATES v. KELNER:
THREATS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the first amendment provides no exception to the
rule that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom
of speech,"' the Court has never interpreted this command to be
an absolute one. 2 Qualification is necessary because speech may
lead to conduct endangering the public safety and welfare. The
individual's right to freedom of expression has been circumscribed, therefore, by the governmental interest in maintaining
law and order.
In United States v. Kelner,4 the Second Circuit attempted to
draw and apply the legal line between these competing interests
in a case of first impression 5 involving a threat transmitted
through broadcasting. 6 Kelner arose out of the incidents surrounding the 1974 visit of Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), to the United States for the pur' U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Dennis v. United States,

341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (dictum).
ISee Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 907

(1963).

4 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 639 (1976).
2

Id. at 1030 (Meskill, J., concurring).
6 In cases not involving threats, the judiciary has evinced particular concern about
the transmission of messages by broadcasting, especially via television. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the government possesses a valid interest in protecting individuals
from receiving unwanted forms of expression within the privacy of the home. See
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971); Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
The intrusion by the transmission of messages by television is particularly severe because of the constant presence and powerful effects of television upon those who watch
it. See generally J. McGINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968 (1969). A problem
with regard to television speech is that "[i]t is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact
of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to." Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
Few commentators have suggested or devised a distinct standard for televised
words, however, and one may question whether the evidence indicating the potency of
televised speech is fully persuasive. See Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:
Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769-71 (1972); Note. The First
Amendment and Regulation of Television News, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 746, 766 (1972). Yet
special treatment for the broadcast media in general has been proposed. The announcement of certain warnings has been suggested to reduce the likelihood that children will be exposed to material considered unsuitable by their parents. See Note,
Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343, 1365 (1970).
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pose of addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Arafat's impending visit "aroused resentment among American
Jews, ' 7 and on the scheduled day of Arafat's arrival the Jewish
Defense League (JDL) held a press conference at which Russell
Kelner, dressed in military fatigues and prominently displaying a
gun, served as the JDL spokesman." In a videotaped interview
with a reporter from a New York television station with a telecast range extending into New Jersey and Connecticut, Kelner
stated:
. . . We have people who have been trained and
who are out now and who intend to make sure that
Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave this country
alive.
We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat....
just the way any other murderer is treated.
...

• . . Everything is planned in detail.
...

It's going to come off.9

The interview was broadcast that night.
Kelner was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for
causing transmission in interstate commerce of a "threat to injure the person of another."'" After a jury trial in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Kelner was convicted." The Second Circuit affirmed the convic534 F.2d at 1021.
Kelner later emphasized that the fatigues, the gun, and the "threat" were designed to counter alleged PLO threats against the JDL and to communicate the anger
of Jews who deplored the PLO's activities. Brief for Appellant at 9.
8

9 534 F.2d at 1021.
10 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1970). The statute provides: "Whoever transmits in interstate
commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat
to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both."
Kelner was also charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), the causation
link enabling prosecution under § 875(c). Because Kelner himself did not transmit the
threat in interstate commerce, the government was forced to assert that he "caused" it
to be transmitted. See note 12 infra. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as
a principal.
11No district court opinion was reported by Judge Richard Owen.
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tion and proposed a new test for cases arising under section
875(c). Writing for the court, Judge Oakes rejected claims that
the defendant had not "caused"'12 the transmission of an interInterestingly, local authorities apparently made no attempt to indict Kelner for any
crime of conspiracy or attempt to assault Arafat. Possibly, no evidence to support such
an indictment could be gleaned from the activities of Kelner or any of the agents who
were supposedly "trained" and "out" to assassinate Arafat. In any event, Kelner was
placed under surveillance after the evening news was broadcast on November 11, 1974.
He was arrested the next day and charged immediately by the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York only with the federal offenses of which he
was ultimately convicted. Brief for Appellant at 12-13; see note 10 supra & accompanying text.
12 534 F.2d at 1022-23; see note 10 supra. Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1970) requires defining the crucial word "cause." The courts have defined "cause" differently:
"'[c]ause' is a word of very broad import and ...

[i]t is used ...

in its well-known sense

of bringing about," United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) (interpreting
statute punishing those who, with intent to defraud, "place, or cause to be placed" any
letter or package in any post office); "[clause means 'to bring about; to bring into
existence,'" United States v. Leggett, 269 F.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir.) (interpreting § 2(b) and
finding that A, knowing that a car was stolen, caused it to be transported across state
lines by telling an automobile salesman, B, to "go ahead and get it" and bring it to the
state where prospective purchaser resided), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959); "one who
'procures' or 'brings about' the commission of a crime is chargeable as a principal under
section 2(b)," United States v. Grasso, 356 F. Supp. 814, 820 (E.D. Pa.) (defendant
found guilty of causing submission of misrepresentations to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973); "a defendant may be
found to be a 'cause' if the result which the law forbids was reasonably foreseeable."
United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant found guilty of
willfully causing interstate transportation of counterfeit securities), vacated per curiam on
other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969). See also United
States v. Markee, 425 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir.) (because he engaged in falsifying sales records "for the purpose of causing another, i.e., the accountant, to submit false statements to the FHA," id. at 1046, defendant found guilty of willfully causing submission
of misrepresentations to the FHA), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 847 (1970); United States v.
Kelley, 395 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.) (because he "told . . . bettors how to get in touch with
him if they wished to make a bet and, therefore it was reasonable to expect that they
would make interstate calls," id. at 729, defendant found guilty under § 2(b) of causing
the use of interstate commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
963 (1968); United States v. Miller, 379 F.2d 483 (7th Cir.) (alternative holding) (because they "consented to and condoned" the illegal activities of their customers, including use of tickertape machine for gambling purposes, id. at 485, defendants found
guilty, as principals under § 2(b), of using interstate facility in aid of unlawful gambling
activity), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967).
Judge Oakes in Kelner accepted the district court's use of the standard, set forth in
Scandifia, to the effect that Kelner could be found to have caused the transmission of
the alleged threat in interstate commerce "if he made the threat in fact and intended,
or could reasonably have foreseen, that the threat would be transmitted by WPIX-TV."
534 F.2d at 1023. Judge Oakes ended his inquiry at this point, dismissing the possibility
that the intermediary who committed the forbidden act, in this case WPIX-TV, could
have had an effect on Kelner's guilt. He considered only the possibility that the intermediary was an innocent dupe, without criminal intent, who was fooled by the defendant. In fact, all of the cases that Judge Oakes cited to support his position involved an
innocent third party who unwittingly committed the criminal act. In United States v.
Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc), a shipper consented to an unsuspecting
codefendant's taking of a shipment, and the defendant was found guilty of aiding and

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 125:919

state communication, that he had not made a "communication,"'

3

abetting theft of a shipment in interstate commerce. In United States v. Lester, 363
F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967), the intermediaries were
unsuspecting police officers. In Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), the intermediary was an innocent bank clerk who mailed a fraudulently obtained check. In
Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967), vacated and remanded sub noma.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), also cited by Judge Oakes, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to transmit in interstate commerce communications
containing threats to injure and murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 875(c) (1970).
No discussion of causation can be found in the court's opinion for the simple reason
that § 2(b) was not involved. See also United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41 (1937) (intermediary was innocent bookkeeper); United States v. Leggett, 269 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.)
(intermediary was innocent automobile salesman), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959);
United States v. Grasso, 356 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa.) (intermediaries were innocent
purchasers), aff'd mem., 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1973).
Judge Oakes, then, failed to address in Kelner the key question whether the participation of an intermediary who is not an innocent dupe, but an actor who acts knowingly, purposefully, and voluntarily, can constitute a supervening cause that relieves the
primary actor of criminal liability. The television station in Kelner was in no way an
innocent dupe deceived by Kelner; therefore, the cases cited by Judge Oakes are inapplicable. In addition, as Judge Meskill pointed out in his concurring opinion, "[n]o
other case [brought under § 875(c)] involves activity like Kelner's, which is so detached
from the act of transmission itself." 534 F.2d at 1030 (Meskill, J., concurring). Judge
Meskill elaborated further:
Whatever Kelner may have foreseen, or for that matter whatever he may have
wished to happen to his statement at the time he mouthed it, he nevertheless
had no control over his threat once it was made. Instead, the decision whether
or not to broadcast, which in effect determined whether or not a crime was
committed, rested within the discretion of the television personnel. Had Kelner
recanted the threat after it was made but before the broadcast, he would have
been powerless to prevent transmission and therefore powerless to prevent the
crime charged here. Thus Kelner was in a position unlike other defendants
prosecuted under this statute, each of whom had control over the threat until
it was transmitted in interstate commerce either by mailing the letter or placing
the phone call.
Id. See generally note 6 supra.
Because the intermediary in Kelner was neither an innocent dupe nor an accomplice or coconspirator whose intent clearly was to commit the crime, but instead was a
television station with first amendment rights of its own as well as certain moral duties
to the public, the Kelner court should have engaged in a more sophisticated analysis of
the effect of an intermediary's actions on the liability of the primary actor. See generally
H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 323-36 (1959).
13534 F.2d at 1023. Although averring that "Congress could not have intended to
have left such a gaping hole in its statutory prohibition," id., Judge Oakes proffered no
support for his argument-either by citing cases or by referring to the legislative history
of § 875(c). See generally notes 47-52 infra & accompanying text (discussion of legislative
history). Judge Oakes argued further that only a "specific intent to communicate a
threat to injure" is required to satisfy the "communication" language of § 875(c), citing
United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mont. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d
715 (9th Cir. 1970). In Holder, the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal, stating that "[i]t
is sufficient to show that the threat was of such a nature as
reasonably to have induced fear, even though the communication was not delivered to
the person threatened." Id. at 301. In Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.
1964), a conviction under § 875(c) was upheld even though the alleged threats made
over the telephone were delivered to persons other than the party whom the defendant
intended to threaten. But in both Holder and Seeber the specific intent to communicate a
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and that the communication had not traveled interstate. 1 4 Judge
Oakes also refused to accept Kelner's constitutional argument,
finding no infringement of first amendment rights. Separate
concurring opinions were submitted by Judges Meskill15 and
6
Mulligan.'
The focus of this Comment is upon the defendant's "fourth
and most troubling"' 7 contention that his statements did not
constitute "threats"' 8 under the statute because they were constitutionally protected "political hyperbole" uttered without intent to employ force. In rejecting this contention, the court observed that the important governmental interest in reducing the
climate of violence justified a reasonable restriction of speech
such as Kelner's.' 9 In determining the bounds of that restriction,
threat to injure was clear, as indicated by the use of the telephone as the means of
communication. One might argue, as did the defendant in Kelner, that the broadcast
of a threat to an indefinite and unknown audience is not a "communication" of that
threat, because the specific intent to communicate such a threat cannot be proven. The
jury in Kelner, however, evidently found that in his use of the means of the televised
press conference Kelner had in fact specifically intended to communicate a threat to
injure. For a further discussion of intent in the Kelner context, see text accompanying
notes 94-109 infra.
14 534 F.2d at 1023-24. Judge Oakes correctly dismissed the contention that because both Kelner and Arafat were in the same state at the time the threat was made,
there could have been no communication of the threat "in interstate commerce." Id. at
1024. Judge Oakes emphasized that the statute requires only that the threat "be
transmitted in commerce." Id. (emphasis in original). United States v. Holder, 302 F.
Supp. 296 (D. Mont. 1969), affd per curiam, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970), lends support
to Judge Oakes' analysis:
It is not necessary that the telephone call "constitute" interstate commerce.
The statute makes it an offense to "transmit" the communication "in" interstate
commerce. It can not be questioned that the nation's vast network of telephone
lines constitutes interstate commerce. It would be a strained construction indeed to hold that the "threat" must relate to "commerce" or "business."
Id. at 298.
15534 F.2d at 1029 (Meskill, J., concurring).
16
1Id. at 1028 (Mulligan, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 1022.
i" Judge Oakes construed the statutory definition of "threat" as "'an expression of
an intention to inflict' injury, of 'such a nature as could reasonably induce fear.' "Id. at
1025. Other courts have defined "threat" similarly: "[tihe test is whether the communication 'in its context' would 'have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its
originator will act according to its tenor,'" United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296,
301 (D. Mont. 1969) (quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 962 (N.D. Il1. 1967),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)), affd per curiam, 427 F.2d
715 (9th Cir. 1970); "the test of whether words or phrases are harmless or threatening
is the context in which they are used, measured by the common experience of the
society in which they are used," United States v. Pennell, 144 F. Supp. 317, 319 (N.D.
Cal. 1956) ("to deal with" found to be threatening within 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1970)).
The jury in Kelner was instructed that mere "political hyperbole or expression of opinion or discussion does not constitute a threat." 534 F.2d at 1025.
19534 F.2d at 1026.
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the court relied on Watts v. United States,2 0 which interpreted a
statute prohibiting threats against the President. 2 1 The court
adopted Watts' construction of the word "threat" as excluding
"statements which are, when taken in context, not 'true threats'
because they are conditional or made in jest. ' 22 A "true threat"
was said to exist "[s]o long as the threat on its face and in the
circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to
convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution. ' 23 The court concluded that a "true threat" could be
proscribed constitutionally regardless of the existence of a
specific intent to carry out the threat. The extent to which the
resulting standard is consistent with first amendment principles,
however, is open to question.
I.

SECTIONS 871 AND 875(c) COMPARED

A.

Section 871

The statute involved in Watts, 18 U.S.C. § 871,24 punishing
knowing and willful threats of violence against the President, was
enacted just prior to World War J.25 Through the first halfcentury of judicial interpretation, the lower courts applied the
statute without acknowledging any potential first amendment
conflict. 26 The earliest interpretations reflected the turbulent

war years when overzealous concern with internal subversion
20394 U.S. 705 (1969), rev'g per curiam 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
21 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1970).
22534 F.2d at 1026 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. at 708).
23
1d. at 1027.
24 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1970). For a history of the statute's interpretation, see Note,
Threatening the President: ProtectedDissenter or PotentialAssassin, 57 GEo. L.J. 553 (1969).
22 Act of Feb. 14, 1917, ch. 64, 39 Stat. 919. In 1955, the statute was amended to
include the Vice President and President-elect. Act of June 1, 1955, ch. 115, § 1, 69
Stat. 80. In 1962, it was further broadened by the inclusion of the "other officer next in
the order of succession" language. Act of Oct. 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-829, § 1, 76
Stat. 956. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970) presently provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyances in the mail or for a
delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing,
print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or inflict
bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the President-elect, the
Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of
President or Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of
President or Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
26 See Note, supra note 24, at 563.

1977]

UNITED STATES v. KELNER

and disloyalty was typical.27 Thus, the courts defined "threat" to
include any understandable arrangement of words conveying
the thought of harming the President, regardless of the context
or intent. 2 8 This lack of serious consideration
of the constitu29
tional question persisted until Watts.
Watts involved a prosecution under section 871 arising from
a threat against President Lyndon Johnson. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the conviction 311 of an eighteen-yearold student who had told a small group of antiwar protestors:
"[I]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first person I want...
in my sights is L.B.J." 3 1 Judge Warren Burger, writing for the
majority, rejected the appellant's claims that this statement was,
as a matter of law, not a threat, and that the lower court had misconstrued the statute's intent requirement.3 2 Over Judge J. Skelly
Wright's dissent, 3 3 the court held that proof of specific intent to
execute the threat was not constitutionally required. The majority found that the need for safety and freedom of movement of
the President provided a legitimate basis for subordination of
the individual's right to speak freely whenever the speaker's
words were susceptible to interpretation as a threat. 34 In effect,
the court authorized punishment of the appellant's choice of
words.
The majority formulation may be regarded as an effort at
balancing the individual and social interest in free speech against
the value of the particular regulation involved to organized
society. 3 5 In contrast, Judge Wright, proceeding from the principle that statutes that impinge upon protected speech must be
precisely drawn and applied, rejected such attempts at balancing

27

See 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 511, 513 (1969).
Probably the most often repeated formula is that of Ragansky v. United States,
253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918):
A threat is knowingly made, if the maker of it comprehends the meaning
of the words uttered by him ....
And a threat is willfully made, if in addition to comprehending the meaning of his words, the maker voluntarily and intentionally utters them as the
declaration of an apparent determination to carry them into execution.
29 Note, supra note 24, at 571.
30 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). For discussion of the circuit court decision, see Note, supra note 24; 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 511
(1969); 47 TEx. L. REV. 712 (1969).
31 402 F.2d at 677.
32
Id. at 680-81.
33Id. at 686 (Wright, J., dissenting).
34Id. at 682.
'5But see note 84 infra. See generally note 90 infra.
28
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in favor of the clear and present danger test.A6 Consonant with
that test, Judge Wright would require that the prosecution prove
that the defendant specifically intended to cause the prohibited
an unamresult and that the defendant's statement constituted
37
biguous threat to the life or safety of the President.
The Supreme Court reversed, 38 finding section 871 to be
"constitutional on its face" 3 9 but requiring under the first
amendment that the interpretation of "threat" exclude political
hyperbole.40 The first amendment was held to shield "crude offensive method[s] of stating a political opposition to the President" from the reach of the statute.4 ' Importantly, in making
this determination, the Court did not resolve the dispute over
the requirement of subjective intent, although the Court expressed doubt concerning Judge Burger's construction of "willfullness" and cited Judge Wright's dissent approvingly.4 2 Rather,
the Court held that a threshold requirement of proof of a "true
threat" was not satisfied.4 3 The issue whether some true threats
might be constitutionally protected remained open after Watts.
Excluding political hyperbole from the definition of a punishable threat does not determine that all other threats may be
penalized even in the absence of a specific intent by the speaker
to cause the harm Congress intended to prevent by enacting the
legislation. This distinction appears to have escaped the Kelner
court.
Because the Supreme Court in Watts did not reach the issue
of what kind of intent was necessary to support a conviction
under section 871, Judge Burger's objective d'efinition of willfullness survived. Under this approach, specific intent to execute
the threat is not an element of the offense; an offense may be
established if the speaker intended simply to utter the words that
a hearer might likely understand to be a threat. The same ap36 402 F.2d at 690 n.II (Wright, J., dissenting). See generally notes 77-93 infra &
accompanying text.
37402 F.2d at 691 (Wright, J., dissenting).
38394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
39
Id.at 707.
4
0 Id.at 708.
41Id. The Court observed: "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . .may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. (quoting New York
Times
Co.v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
42
4

Id.

1Id.: "[T]he statute initially requires the Government to prove a true 'threat.' We
do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within
that statutory term."

19771

UNITED STATES v. KELNER

proach has been employed by a majority of the courts of appeals
that have considered the question since the Supreme Court decision in Watts. 4
An alternative position was suggested by Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Douglas, in United States v. Rogers,4 5 a section
871 case reversed by the Court on a procedural error. Criticizing
the majority for not considering the substantive issues, Justice
Marshall argued that a broad objective construction of willfullness fails to comport with the legislative history and purposes of
the statute. Perceiving first amendment implications, Justice
Marshall suggested a requirement of "proof that the speaker
intended his statement to be taken as a threat, even if he had no
intention of actually carrying it out."4 6 Justice Marshall's position
differs from Judge Wright's dissent in Watts with respect to the
degree of perceived conflict between section 871 and the first
amendment as well as the degree of intent required to cure
statutory overbreadth.
B. Section 875(c)
Section 875 originally was intended to punish extortion
threats "not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion," 4 7 and therefore outside the ambit of the first
44 The following decisions have adhered to that approach: United States v. Hall,
493 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975); United States v.
Rogers, 488 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S.
35 (1975); United States v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368, 1369 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
952 (1972); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 861 (1972); United States v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. at 1014 (1971); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1969). In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit has required proof of specific intent to injure the President,
to incite others to do so, or to interfere with the movements of the President. United
States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971), discussed at note 94 infra.
45 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
46 Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
17 Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)), rev'd per curiam,
394 U.S. 705 (1969). As originally enacted, the statute was designed to prevent criminals from purposely using means of communication, other than the mails, to convey
threats and demands and from thereby evading the effect of the Patterson Act, which
made unlawful the transmission of threats through the mails with the intent to extort
money or other things of value. Section 875(c), then, was "virtually an amendment of
the Patterson Act, based on the Federal power over interstate commerce, to prevent...
evasion of that act." S. REP'. No. 533, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); see H. R. REP. No.
1456, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
Such threats involve an attempt to obtain something of value in exchange for nonperformance by the extortionist of his threatened conduct. Many such cases have resulted in convictions under § 875(c) and related provisions. See, e.g., Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (conviction under § 875(b)-(c) for threat made by defendant
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amendment. As an increase in invective accompanied a heightened political radicalism, threats became a more common currency in political exchange. At the request of the Department of
Justice, Congress amended the statute in 1939 for the purpose
of making the various extortion statutes uniform and for the
further purpose of making the transmission in interstate commerce of a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another an offense, in and of itself.48 In interpreting the
amended provision, the courts looked to the presidential counterpart. Like section 871, section 875(c) was considered not to
include as an element of the statutory offense a specific intent to
execute the threat.4 9 Without the necessity of proving specific
to injure his business partner physically unless the latter released 100,000 shares of
stock to defendant); Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967) (conviction
under § 875(c) for communication of threat to injure unless victim returned money
invested by the defendant), vacated and remanded sub nom. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969); Calhoun v. United States, 368 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1966) (conviction
under § 875(d) for defendant's threat to injure reputation of businessman who had
succumbed to two prostitutes unless money was forwarded to him); Seeber v. United
States, 329 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1964) (conviction under § 875(c) for threat to take the life
of the person threatened unless latter repaid a debt of $10,000 owed to defendant's
wife); United States v. Feudale, 271 F. Supp. 115 (D. Conn. 1967) (conviction under 18
U.S.C. §§ 875(d), 1952 (1970) for threat made by defendant to ruin the reputation of a
homosexual director of elementary education in the Danbury public school system unless he received money).
48 Act of May 15, 1939, ch. 133, § 2, 53 Stat. 744; see United States v. Pennell, 144
F. Supp. 317, 319 (N.D. Cal. 1956); S. REP. No. 349, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1939);
H.R. REP. No. 102, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939).
Note, however, that even the amended statute in its present form, note 10 supra,
has not been interpreted in the context of a threat transmitted through the broadcast
media. Prosecutions under § 875 have involved interstate threats made by telephone or
mail, and the principal issues usually have been the identity of the person making the
threats and the admissibility of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Bozeman, 496 F.2d
508 (5th Cir. 1974) (threat by telephone, identity and "threat" at issue), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1044 (1975); United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 977 (1971) (threat by telephone, identity at issue); United States v. LeVison, 418
F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1969) (threat by telephone, evidentiary issue); Kolod v. United
States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967) (threat by telephone, evidentiary issue), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); United States v.
Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1966) (threat by telephone, evidentiary issue); United
States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mont. 1969) (threat by telephone, identity and
"in interestate commerce" at issue), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Feudale, 271 F. Supp. 115 (D. Conn. 1967) (threat by telephone, "threat" at
issue); United States v. Pennell, 144 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (threat by mail,
intent and "threat" at issue). In other contexts, the courts have attributed considerable
significance to messages broadcast through the air waves, particularly via television. See
note 6 supra.
" See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 523 ,F.2d 8, 10 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975); United
States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969); Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d
572, 577 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Mont.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970). An objective standard is arguably
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intent, prosecutions for threats that are arguably "part and parcel of the communication of ideas, particularly political ideas," 5 1'
are necessarily more prone to encroach on first amendment interests. Using this premise, the defendant in Kelner argued that
section 875(c) is constitutionally infirm. But the court asserted
that Watts provides the complete test for constitutionality, not
only for section 871 but also for section 875(c).
The conclusion that the test for section 871 governs the
constitutionality of section 875(c) is questionable, however, in
light of the different interests that the two statutes were designed to protect. The District of Columbia Circuit in Watts
observed that not only was section 871 designed to prevent actual injury to the President by the threatener's carrying out his
threat or inciting others to do so, 5 ' but the statute was also formulated to prevent the restriction of the President's movements
and the necessity of heightened efforts to protect him.5 2 The
negative impact on a President's freedom of movement and the
efforts of those charged with his protection, unlike the occurrence of actual physical violence, may flow automatically from
the mere publication of the threat. This kind of harm may have
53
unique implications for the protected status of a threat.
Although the court in Kelner never enumerated any specific
evils that section 875(c) was intended to prevent, the court described general purposes of the statute:

more justifiable under § 875(c) than under § 871 because of the absence of the term
"willfully" from the former. But § 875(c) must still be interpreted wih a view toward the
requirements of the first amendment.
Section 875(c) has been construed to require that the act be done "knowingly."
Seeber v. United States, 329 F.2d at 577. Conviction under § 875(c) "requires a showing
that a threat was intended." United States v. Dutsch, 357 F.2d 331, 333 (4th Cir. 1966);
accord, United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d at 510-11, cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975);
United States v. LeVison, 418 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1969) (proof of subsequent
threats admitted into evidence to establish intent at time of threat). Although the words
in question "must avow a threat to injure, . . . it is not necessary to prove the specific
intent to injure or the present ability to carry out the threat." United States v. Holder,
302 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Mont. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970)
(footnote omitted). But the Constitution arguably requires both intent to threaten and
intent to execute the threat. See text accompanying notes 94-109 infra.
50Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
51 Id. at 678, 682, 684; see United States v. Stickrath, 242 F. 151, 153 (S.D. Ohio
1917), aff'd sub noma.
Clark v. United States, 250 F. 449 (5th Cir. 1918); Note, supra note
24, at 558.
52402 F.2d at 682; see United States v. Rogers, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); United States v. Stickrath, 242 F. 151, 153 (S.D. Ohio 1917), affd sub nom.
Clark v. United States, 250 F. 449 (5th Cir. 1918); Note, supra note 24, at 558.
53See text accompanying notes 55 & 102-04 infra.
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As a part of the Government's constitutional responsibility to insure domestic tranquility, it is properly concerned-in an era of ever-increasing acts of violence
and terrorism, coupled with technological opportunities
to carry out threats of injury-with prohibiting as criminal conduct specific threats of physical injury to others,
whether directed toward our own54 or another nation's
leaders or members of the public.
The circuit court's statement indicates that section 875(c) was
intended to prevent actual physical violence. Violence may result
from a threat if either the threatener executes the threat or
someone else is incited by the threat to injure the speaker, the
person threatened, or perhaps someone else. An additional
harm that might be relevant to section 875(c), although not recognized by the Kelner court, is the subjective impact (emotional
distress) of a threat on the person threatened. 55 This last potential harm may be analogous to the restrictions on the President's
movements that section 871 was designed to prevent, in that the
harm may arise from the simple publication of the threat.
Section 875(c), then, arguably is addressed to three evils: (1)
physical injury to the person threatened by the threatener; (2)
physical injury to the threatener, the person threatened, or
another person by someone incited by the threat; (3) psychologi2 534 F.2d at 1026.
5 The Kelner court made two ambiguous references to the harm of emotional distress. The first reference may imply that the circuit court rejected the prevention of
that harm as a statutory purpose:
Appellant argues that there was no "communication" within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) because there was no specific person to whom the threat
was addressed and to whom the defendant intended to cause emotional suffering. The claim is that the broadcast of the threat to an indefinite and unknown
audience is not a "communication" of that threat. The mere statement of this
argument suggests its improbability.
Id. at 1023.
The second reference utilizes the word "fear" in a fashion that vaguely suggests
recognition of mental distress as a harm addressed by the statute: "In order to convict
under the charge given, the jury had to, and we must assume did, find that the statements were more than political, that they were 'an expression of an intention to inflict'
injury, of 'such a nature as could reasonably induce fear.'" Id. at 1025 (emphasis in
original). But the court may have incorporated the word "fear" in its definition of
"threat" simply to exclude from the statute words that on their face are political or
made in jest. See id. The court may not have meant to suggest that the creation of fear,
in and of itself, justifies suppression of speech, but it may have presumed that threats
that are facially credible have enough likelihood of leading to physical injury to warrant
suppression. Such a presumption, however, particularly without a requirement of
specific intent to carry out the threat, may afford insufficient protection to speech. See
text accompanying notes 94-109 infra.
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cal injury to someone who hears the threat, particularly the person threatened. As noted above, the Kelner court appears to construe section 875(c) as dealing with only the first two harms. If
section 875(c) is in fact addressed only to the first two harms, a
different intent requirement may be appropriate for section 871
and section 875(c).5 6
Another distinguishing element between section 875(c) and
section 871 is that the presidential statute was designed to preclude events having a substantial detrimental impact upon the
country whereas the counterpart provision was formulated to
prevent harm to individual members of the public generally. In
Kelner, the court attempted to bridge this gap by ascribing national interests to section 875(c): "[W]e believe that important
national interests similar to those in Watts exist here, more specifically, the governmental interest of reducing the climate of vio'57
lence to which true threats of injury necessarily contribute.
But this unsupported assertion is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the circumstances in which speech may
be suppressed. As Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v.
California,5 8 argued:
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence
or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education
and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. 59
Moreover, the Kelner court's insistence on the similarity of
the interests involved in Watts and the case before it is not borne
out by the Watts decision itself. The Kelner court rejected as
dictum the statement of Judge Burger in his majority opinion in
the Watts circuit court decision that a statute prohibiting threats
against citizens generally might be susceptible to constitutional
challenge.6 1 Yet the distinction between threats against the President and against citizens generally was important to the uphold-

'6
See text accompanying

notes 53, 55 supra & 94-107 infra.
57 534 F.2d at 1026.
S8 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam).
s Id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
60 534 F.2d at 1026 n.7 (construing Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 683 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
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ing of the constitutionality of section 871 in Watts. The District of
Columbia Circuit stated in Watts:
A statute making it a criminal act to utter threats as
to citizens generally might well be open to constitutional
challenge. Assuming arguendo that a statute might not
be sustained if applied to any threat toward any one of
200 million Americans, the statute here in question
must be judged by different standards ....61
The court in a footnote observed that "[t]his distinction was
clearly recognized by the drafters of section 871.1"62 Also, subsequent to Watts, the Fourth Circuit stated in United States v.
Patillo6 3 that "[a] threat against the President may cause substantial harm and is qualitatively different from a threat against a
64
private citizen or other public official.
Thus, adoption by the Kelner court of the test used for section 871 is disturbing given the arguably different interests protected by section 875. Even assuming that some of the concerns
addressed by section 875(c) are of sufficient magnitude to justify
the suppression of speech on occasion, the particular harms contemplated by section 871 and section 875(c) may dictate disparate intent requirements for the two statutes. Finally, even if the
two statutes were strictly comparable, so that the test announced
by the Supreme Court in Watts could be applied appropriately in
a section 875(c) case, the Kelner court has misinterpreted that
test as an inclusive one requiring no specific intent, although in
fact the test is simply a threshold one that does not dispose of the
question of intent. The validity and application of section 875(c)
must be adjudged, therefore, in light of that section's own purposes and effects; invocation of Watts and section 871 is insufficient.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

In Kelner, the Second Circuit correctly determined the constitutional question to be whether defendant's speech, which had
61 402 F.2d at 683.
62

Id. at 683 n.16. The circuit court quoted 53 CONG. REC. 9377 (1916):
It is a crime to assault any person, but it is not a crime to assault the
President any more than any other person. It is a crime against the person, but
it ought to be a very different offense. Assaulting the President ... is quite a
different matter from assaulting some private individual. That is the reason
the gentleman's bill has the provision against threats.
63 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
64
1d. at 15 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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not "ripened" by any act into conduct constituting an attempt,
could be punished without offense to the first amendment.6 5 In
affirming Kelner's conviction, the court held that section 875(c)
66
proscribed only "true threats" and was therefore constitutional.
The court refused to rely on the fighting words doctrine, and
suggested that the clear and present danger test was inappropriate in the Kelner context. As noted above, the court also held
that specific intent to carry out the threat was not mandated by
the first amendment, provided that only "true threats" were
prohibited by section 875(c). But the court never really established the relationship between its constitutional standard and
the specific harms to which section 875(c) is addressed; to that
extent, the court's choice of a constitutional standard was unsubstantiated. Also, the inappropriateness of the clear and present
danger test in section 875(c) cases, at least for some purposes, is
not at all obvious. Furthermore, depending on the precise objectives of section 875(c), a requirement of specific intent to execute
the threat is suggested by some Supreme Court first amendment
decisions.
A.

The Fighting Words Doctrine

In evaluating the protected status of Kelner's allegedly
threatening statements, the Second Circuit considered and rejected the fighting words doctrine. Fighting words, "those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace, ' 67 are not afforded first
amendment protection. Application of the doctrine to Kelner's
utterances would have enabled the circuit court to dispose of the
constitutional issue routinely. The court distinguished Chaplinsky
v. New Hamphire68 and Cantwell v. Connecticut,69 the primary cases
identified with the fighting words doctrine:
We do not ... rest on this simplistic and perhaps misleading [application of the fighting words doctrine].
65534 F.2d at 1026.
66 Id. at 1026-27.

67Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see Rutzick, Offensive
Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1974); Steele, The Impact of the New Penal Code on First Amendment Freedoms, 38 TEx. B.J.
245, 251 (1975); Comment, Violence and Obscenity-ChaplinskyRevisited, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 141 (1973). In contrast to this approach to fighting words, the Supreme Court has
denied constitutional protection to obscenity on the basis of its lack of "serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
68 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
69310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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Professor Emerson points out that both Chaplinsky and
Cantwell were cases involving the use of expression that
might lead to a breach of the peace in the streets, that is
to say, they were incitement cases. . .

Here the crime

charged is not that appellant was inciting others to assassinate Arafat but that he himself was threatening to
7
do so. 1

The court's rejection of the fighting words doctrine, and
particularly its treatment of Chaplinsky and Cantwell, raises important questions concerning the harms that the court perceived
as relevant to section 875(c). 71 First, did the court mean to rule
out the danger of injury to the speaker by the person to whom
the threat was directed as a harm to which section 875(c) was
addressed? The risk of retaliation by the person threatened lies
at the core of the fighting words doctrine.7 2 Accordingly, the
court's holding the fighting words doctrine inapplicable suggests
that physical injury to the person making a threat was not an evil
Congress intended to prevent by enacting section 875(c). Second,
did the court similarly dismiss the danger that the threat might
incite others to injure or murder the person threatened? This
would appear to be the case considering the distinction of
Chaplinsky and Cantwell as general incitement cases and the flat
statement that "the crime charged is not that appellant was inciting others to assassinate Arafat but that he himself was threatening to do so."173 As already noted, 74 the incitement of others to

injure the President was an important concern of section 871, as
construed in Watts. Third, did the court also deny that the prevention of psychological harm (emotional distress) to the person
threatened was a purpose of section 875(c)? Although in an im70 534

F.2d at 1025-26

(citations omitted). Additionally, the court's rejecting

Chaplinsky and Cantwell, rather than using the cases as indirect support, foreshadows the
court's later repudiation of the clear and present danger test, see text accompanying
note 77 infra, which perhaps underlies the decision in Chaplinsky and Cantwell. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940):
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order,
appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.
One may ... be guilty of the offense [of breach of the peace] if he commit acts
or make statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order.
Id. at 308-09.
71
See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
72
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hamphsire,
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
73534 F.2d at 1026.
74
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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portant sense Chaplinsky and Cantwell were incitement cases, the
fighting words doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky included concern for the injury resulting from the
mere 7statement
of the constitutionally unprotected fighting
5
words.

If all three questions were answered affirmatively, section
875(c) would be intended to prevent, according to the court,
only physical injury by the threatener to the person threatened.
As shall be discussed,76 such a construction of section 875(c)
would have significant implications for the constitutional standard and mens rea requirement to be applied to the statute.
B.

The Clear and PresentDanger Test

In construing section 875(c) in light of the first amendment,
the Kelner court expressly repudiated the clear and present
danger test:
We are aware that Judge Wright in his dissent, Watts,
supra, . . . declared that he had no doubt that the "clear

and present danger" test applied t6 the threat statute
there, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and required "willfully" there be
read to require specific intent to execute the threat. We
are by no means certain that the "clear and present
danger" test in any of its various formulations-even
the most recent, in Dennis v. United States, . . -is

ap-

propriate in this case. Although it may be true that the
"historic standard" has survived in a particular formula
in contempt of court cases, see Wood v. Georgia,... it has

not been relied upon by the Supreme Court in the field
of its nascence (government control over the advocacy
of violence) since Dennis. See Brandenburgv. Ohio ...

.77

The demise of the clear and present danger test, however, is less
certain than the Kelner court suggests. Despite subtle reformulations of the "historic standard," its basic focus on whether the
speech in question is likely to bring about particular evils that the
legislature has attempted to prevent remains viable.
The classic formulation of the clear and present danger test
75 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted): "There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include...
"fighting" words--those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
76 See text accompanying notes 96-107 & 114-17 infra.
77534 F.2d at 1026-27 n.8 (citations omitted).
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was announced in Schenck v. United States, 78 in which the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of a person who had advocated
opposition to the draft. The Court observed: "The question in
every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
the substantive evils that Congress has
that they will bring 7about
9
a right to prevent.
In 1951, the Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States"' surveyed its decisions in cases involving direct limitations on speech.
The Court concluded that the clear and present danger test was
the rule of these cases, and endorsed Judge Learned Hand's
formulation of the test in the court below: "In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.""' Later Supreme Court cases did not
abandon the clear and present danger standard but clarified and
applied it. Yates v. United States"2 emphasized that advocacy of
overthrow divorced from any effort to instigate action could not
be punished under the Smith Act consistently with the commands of the first amendment. Scales v. United States8 3 similarly
held that membership in any organization that advocated the
violent overthrow of the United States government was not constitutionally punishable absent active membership: "The membership clause, as here construed, does not cut deeper into the
freedom of association than is necessary to deal with 'the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' Schenck.
"84

78 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For discussion of the history of the clear and present danger
test, see McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182 (1959); Strong, Fifty
Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 41. For more contemporary evaluations of the test, see Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Free Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555 (1976);
Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Note, The Clear and Present Danger Standard: Its Present
Vitality, 6 U. RIcH. L. REV. 93 (1971).
19 249 U.S. at 52.
80 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming the convictions of Communist Party leaders
under the Smith Act for advocating the violent overthrow of the government).
81 Id. at 510.
82354 U.S. 298 (1957).
83367 U.S. 203 (1961).
84
Id. at 229. The court in Kelner sought to discredit the clear and present danger
test by ascribing it to the dissenter, rather than the majority, in the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Watts. 534 F.2d at 1026-27 n.8. The Watts majority, however, noted:
"Without entering the fashionable semantic debate . . . on the vitality of 'clear and
present danger,' 'balancing of interests,' or other labeled 'tests' for determining First
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Brandenburgv. Ohio,85 which the Kelner court cited as proof
that the clear and present danger test had been abandoned,
reaffirmed Dennis and Yates. Although in stating the rule of
Dennis the Court did not employ the words "clear and present
danger," the Court emphasized the imminency of the danger to
the government's regulatory interest resulting from speech directed to producing lawless action:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.8 6
The Court's terminology in Brandenburg has created some
disagreement over whether the Court announced a new "incitement" standard8 7 or simply restated the historical clear and preAmendment controversies, we conclude that the present regulation is valid within the
strictures of any of these criteria." 402 F.2d at 683-84 n.18. Furthermore, the majority
explicitly relied on Dennis and Schenck in discussing when speech may be limited constitutionally. Id. at 682. Thus, the court stated, "[w]hen the gravity of this evil [death or
disability of a President] is discounted by the not so improbable likelihood of its occurrence, we conclude that it 'justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger.' Dennis v. United States .
I...
Id. at 684.
85 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). For discussion of the case, see, e.g., Linde,
supra note 78; Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test For All Seasons?, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975).
86 395 U.S. at 447. The Court applied the test to reverse a conviction under an
Ohio criminal syndicalism statute of a Ku Klux Klan leader for advocating the duty of
violence to promote reform. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, understood the
majority as simply citing Dennis without agreeing with the clear and present danger
doctrine on which Dennis relied. Id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring). Of course, Justice
Black had made evident that he though the clear and present danger test had no place
in the interpretation of the first amendment. See, e.g., id.; Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Brandenburg was reaffirmed in Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974),
in which the Court struck down a statute requiring that a party submit to a loyalty oath
(stating that the party does not advocate the violent overthrow of the government) in
order that the party may gain a place on the state ballot.
In Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (reversing the conviction of a
demonstrator who, while police were clearing the street of demonstrators, stated in a
loud voice either "We'll take the fucking street again," or "We'll take the fucking street
later"), the Court quoted Brandenburgwith approval: "[A State may not proscribe advocacy of law violation] except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite and produce such action." Id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447).
' 7 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EPRESSION 157 (1970); Kalven,
ProfessorErnst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 235, 236 n.6 (1973).
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sent danger test.8 8 Perhaps after Brandenburg both incitement

and a present danger may be necessary conditions for the suppression of the advocacy of violence.8 9 Thus, the Court may have
retained the clear and present danger standard, while refining it
to afford greater protection to abstract advocacy. 9"
88

See, e.g., Strong, supra note 78, at42; 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 210, 211, 214 (1970); 72

W. VA. L. REV. 117, 122 (1970).

8
See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Leary v. United
States, 431 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1970); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 203
(D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975); Comment, supra note 85, at 159-60.
9"See Comment, supra note 85, at 159. As an alternative to the clear and present
danger test and the "true threat" test employed in Kelner, a balancing test might be
used to determine which if any threats against members of the general public are constitutionally punishable under § 875(c). According to Professor Emerson, the balancing
test "would ask whether the social interest in avoiding violence and disorder outweighs
the social interest in allowing freedom of expression .... . T. EMERSON, supra note 87, at
324; see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Frantz, The First Amendment in
the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation,
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75; Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political
Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REV. 4 (1961); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1968).
The District of Columbia Circuit in Watts held that § 871 was valid within the strictures
of the balancing of interests test as well as the clear and present danger test. 402 F.2d
at 683-84 n.18.
Use of the balancing test to determine the protected status of a threat would necessitate inquiries regarding the severity of the evils thought to flow from the threat. How
the balance would be struck might depend upon whether the feared harm were injury,
death, or emotional distress. The identity of the victim of the feared harm might also
be a factor. The social interest in protecting the President might be stronger than the
interest in safeguarding another political figure, or a citizen at large.
A number of questions also would arise concerning the weight to be assigned the
speaker's interest: Would the speaker's interest in engaging in a given kind of speech be
a variable in the balancing formula or would the interest in free speech be a constant?
Would threats against nonpolitical figures ironically be afforded less protection than
threats against political figures because the former threats would be less political in
nature? Or does every threat embody an "idea," even if only contempt for the person
threatened? Cf. United States v. Mitchell, 463 F.2d 187, 192-93 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973) (defendant convicted of violating Hobbs Act by attempting
to obstruct interstate commerce through extortion; persons threatened were not political figures but threat made in context of dispute concerning hiring of black employee;
court indicated that alleged threat might have been constitutionally protected speech if
it had not been communicated directly to persons threatened); United States v. Barcley,
452 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1971) (defendant convicted of communicating threats by mail in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1970) for sending threatening letters to court-appointed
counsel and prosecutor after conviction in another case; held, defendant's equivocal language not a threat but constitutionally protected speech).
Perhaps what the Kelner court attempted to do in fashioning its "true threat" standard was to identify a certain kind of speech (a "true threat") in which a speaker would
have no legitimate interest. Professor Emerson, however, on whom the court relied
repeatedly in shaping its constitutional analysis, recognizes legitimate free speech interests in speech involved in all inchoate crimes. See T. EMERSON, supra at 403-05 (solicitation); id. 407-09 (attempts); id. 409-11 (conspiracy); cf. id. 405-07 (use of expression as
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Instead of engaging in a dubious historical judgment, then,
about the continuing vitality of the clear and present danger
standard, the court in Kelner should have considered carefully
whether the circumstances in the case before it mandated an
application of some version of the test. Underlying the clear and
present danger standard is the notion that speech should not be
suppressed until suppression is unavoidable to protect an important governmental interest. Thus, the clear and present danger
test, as developed in the decisions discussed above, embodies
several requirements designed to guarantee maximum protection to pure speech. First, before the government may punish
the speaker, he must have a specific intent to bring about the
evils the legislature has sought to prevent. 9 1 Second, those
evils must be substantial.9 2 Third, the danger created by the
speech must be present; thus, when the speaker is advocating
violence, the advocacy must be directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action. 93 To the extent that an alternative test
evidence of a crime of action). Moreover, Professor Emerson is opposed to the use of a
balancing test at all, and regards balancing on a particularistic basis (such as weighing
the speaker's interest in engaging in a threat) as an improper regulation of speech
based on content:
[Aipplied in general terms [the balancing test] supplies no satisfactory answer.
If the interest in maintaining the public peate is deemed to outweigh the interest in freedom of speech, then speech would always be sacrificed ....
If the
balance were struck the other way, and freedom of expression preferred, then
the court would be adopting a full protection theory; but the test would give
no answer to such crucial questions as defining expression or separating .expression from action, and therefore would supply no rational basis for making
an "absolute" system work. Nor is there any sound way to employ the balancing test on a more particularistic basis. For this would immediately plunge the
Court into the forbidden role of evaluating the content of particular speech.
Id. 324.
91 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 221, 229 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 499-500, 515-16
(1951); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626-29 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13,
16 (4th Cir. 1971) (§ 871); Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); see Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
92 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508, 510 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), majority opinion overruled, Bandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam); Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). But see
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (breach of peace); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (breach of peace); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
308 (1940) ("riot, disorder, interference with traffic").
93 Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448 (1974); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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would permit the suppression of speech before the government's
regulatory interest is seriously threatened, the standard would
allow unwarranted intrusion on first amendment interests. A
comparison of the Kelner standard with the clear and present
danger standard delineated above indicates that the difference
between the two tests is not simply semantic. Although under
certain assumptions the Kelner standard may yield the same result as the traditional free expression standard, it fails to require
explicit consideration of the relationship between the speech in
question and the harms against which Congress legislated and
therefore might allow unnecessary infringement on protected
speech.
C. The Kelner Standard
The Second Circuit in Kelner seemed to incorporate in its
test for a "true threat" the objective standard of intent rejected
by Justice Marshall in Rogers v. United States:94 "So long as the
threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so
unequivocal ... as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent
'95
prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied.
Relating this standard to the purposes underlying section 875(c)
reveals that the Kelner test may punish threats not posing a clear
and present danger of producing harms Congress intended to
prevent.
As elaborated above, section 875(c) might have been in94 422 U.S. 35, 41 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas, reached the intent issue in a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall
reasoned that because a threat made with no intention of executing it might still restrict
the President's movements and evoke a response from those charged with his protection, intent to carry out the threat was not required. Yet Justice Marshall believed that a
speaker should not be punished for making a statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a threat, unless he intended to make a threatening statement. Thus, Justice
Marshall required both that the statement be in fact threatening, and that the speaker
intend the statement to be threatening. Id. at 47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971), adopted
an even more stringent mens rea requirement than Justice Marshall's: "We think that
an essential element of guilt is a present intention either to injure the President, or
incite others to injure him, or to restrict his movements ...." Id. at 16. Although the
Fourth Circuit would not require specific intent to carry out the threat if the speaker
were prosecuted for having restricted the President's movements, the court would still
require "an intent to disrupt presidential activity." Id. at 15-16.
As already noted, note 44 supra & accompanying text, the Kelner court correcdy
indicated that several courts have rejected a stringent intent requirement.
95534 F.2d at 1027 (emphasis supplied). Note that in defining the statutory term
"communication," the court held that proof that Kelner had a specific intent "to communicate a threat of injury through means reasonably adapted to that purpose" was
necessary for a conviction under § 875(c). Id. at 1023. See generally note 13 supra.
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tended to prevent physical injury to the threatener by the
threatened, physical injury to the threatened by the threatener
or by someone else incited by the threat, physical injury to an
unrelated party by someone incited by the threat, or emotional
distress to the threatened. 96 Of these possible harms, the one
least likely to occur in the absence of a specific intent to carry out
the threat is physical injury to the threatened by the threatener.
But the Kelner court may have ruled out incitement of others to
violence as a possible evil addressed by section 875(c), 97 and the
court never really claims that prevention of emotional distress
was an objective of section 875(c). 9 8 Thus, if Congress' concern
in enacting section 875(c) was the prevention of the execution of
threats by the threateners, a requirement of specific intent to
carry out the threat would be necessary to ensure that speech is
punished only to halt a clear and present danger of subsequent
violence by the speaker. In fact, the statute's emphasis on speech
in such circumstances may be altogether inappropriate. The
threat itself would not likely bring about the feared result.
Rather, the threat would be meaningful only as an indication of
the speaker's intent to injure the person threatened. Punishing
the speaker without the speaker's having taken action to execute
the threat may amount to punishment for criminal intent alone.
The Kelner court itself conceded that the defendant's threat had
"not ripened by any overt act into conduct in the nature of an
attempt."99 Thus, at the very least, proof of specific intent to
execute the threat would be indispensable to a conviction obtained to thwart physical injury by the threatener to the
threatened.
Despite the court's statement to the contrary, were section
875(c) intended to deter incitement of others to violent action, a
specific intent that the threat be carried out might be less important because regardless of the speaker's intent others might still
be aroused to action by the speech. But absent such intent the
speaker's aim might be accomplished without bringing about the
evils sought to be constrained."' Additionally, the requirement
of specific intent to accomplish the violence advocated is well
established in incitement cases. 1
96 Text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
97See text accompanying note 73 supra.
9

See note 55 supra & accompanying text.

99534 F.2d at 1026.
100 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 499-500, 515-16 (1951).
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The harm for which specific intent to carry out the threat is
least important is that of emotional distress of the threatened.
Although specific intent to make a threat may be required to
prevent the punishment of merely negligent behavior, 0 2 the
person threatened may suffer emotional distress whether or not
the speaker intended to execute the threat, provided that he
believes the speaker intended to carry out the threat. Perhaps
with regard to emotional distress, the objective standard, embodied in the Kelner court's own test for a "true threat," would
ensure adequately that only speech that was likely to produce the
evil with which Congress was concerned would be punished.
But the court in Kelner appears to rely only on the interests
of deterring acts of violence and physical injury in holding the
statute and its application constitutional. 0 3 With regard to these
interests, a requirement of specific intent to execute the threat is
important to prevent unnecessary interference with expression.
The court may have been reluctant to rely on the emotionaldistress harm in justifying the restriction on Kelner's speech because that harm may not be substantial enough to warrant suppression of speech. As noted above in the discussion of section
871,104 even assuming that the interests underlying the presidential threat statute are adequate to justify limited restrictions on
expression, some question exists whether the qualitatively lesser
interests involved in the general threat statute are of sufficient
magnitude to support similar restrictions on speech. Either the
death or physical injury of citizens generally, even absent significant danger to the state, is probably an evil of sufficient severity to warrant prohibition of threats that have not risen to the
level of actual attempts.10 5 Emotional distress of the person
threatened, however, may not be.
In fact, the emotional impact of expression may be central
to its message. Thus, punishing speech (not constituting incitement) because of its emotional effects on the hearer, arguably
transgresses the permissible bounds of regulation. 0 6 Kelner's
statements "articulated a wish harbored by countless law-abiding
See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
103 Text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
104 Text accompanying notes 57-64 supra.
105 Cf., e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (breach of peace); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (breach of peace).
" 6 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971): "We cannot sanction the view
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has
little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated."
102
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citizens who had no public forum, who would feel inhibited in
expressing similar hopes, but who nonetheless thought that a
wanton murderer such as Arafat deserved to be a victim of the
kinds of crimes he had inflicted on innocent civilians."'107 To
regulate this form of communication for the purpose of preventing emotional distress to the person threatened may be effectively to suppress the full impact of the message.
If speech cannot be regulated to shield persons from the
emotional impact of threats, but can be circumscribed only to
prevent death or physical injury of the person threatened, a
requirement of specific intent to execute the threat would be
mandated by the first amendment. The Second Circuit in Kelner
agreed with the circuit court majority in Watts that a specific
intent requirement would impose upon a jury the "almost impossible task of evaluating [a defendant's] subjective mental processes in relation to executing his apparent intent as that intent
was manifested by his words and gestures in context."'1 "8 Evidentiary difficulties, however, should not suffice to negate a constitutional imperative, as the Court noted in Dennis: "Nor does
the fact that there must be an investigation of a state of mind
under this interpretation afford any basis for rejection of that
meaning.... The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence."' 0 9
Even given a specific intent to bring about a substantial evil,
a person making a threat cannot be punished under the clear
and present danger standard unless the danger created by the
threat is imminent. The Kelner court appears to have incorporated an imminency of danger requirement into its test
for a "true threat" by stating that such threats must be "unconditional, immediate," and "convey" an "imminent prospect of
execution."" 0
The imminency of danger posed by a threat, however, may
Brief for Appellant at 34.
F.2d at 1027 (quoting Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1968), rev'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
100 341 U.S. at 500. The Fourth Circuit has indicated that specific intent to execute
a threat can be determined by considering "all relevant facts concerning the background of the defendant, his motives, the manner in which the threat was made, and
the reaction of those who heard the threat." United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16
(4th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
Note that "[u]nder state statutes, criminal conviction for threatening a person with
injury or death requires proof that the maker of the threat had the specific intent to
carry it out." 47 TEX. L. REV. 712, 712 (1969) (footnote omitted).
107

108534

110 534 F.2d at 1027.
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depend on the particular harm section 875(c) was intended to
prevent. Unless the relevant harm is emotional stress, a threat
that simply conveyed an "imminent prospect of execution" would
not create a present danger of the realization of the feared
harm. If the relevant harm were the physical injury of the person threatened, only an actual "imminent prospect of execution"
would give rise to a present danger of such injury. The nature of
the threat and its attending circumstances, including the present
ability of the threatener to carry out the threat, would be relevant to the determination of the existence of such a prospect.
As part of its imminency requirement, the Kelner court ruled
that the threat must be "unconditional." The District of Columbia Circuit in Watts recognized that if speech is conditioned upon
elements that cannot be fulfilled, the condition may remove the
apparent intent that is a necessary element of a threat."'
A threat conditioned upon a contingency subject to the
threatener's control, however, was said to be constitutionally
punishable:
That the threat is conditioned upon a contingency
subject to the maker's control does not deprive it of the
quality of a threat, if the contingency be a possible one.
Every threat unexecuted involves some contingency, if
none other than that the maker's purpose be not aban' 2
doned, or that execution by him be not prevented. 1
But if the harm addressed by section 875(c) were physical injury
resulting from the execution of a threat, a condition involving
time delay would lessen the immediacy of the danger in direct
proportion to the delay, even if the condition were within the
control of the person making the threat. On the other hand, if
the harm to be guarded against were emotional distress, the
harm might likely flow from a conditional threat involving a
contingency that the speaker could not control, as long as one
hearing the threat could reasonably believe that the speaker was
able to fulfill the condition. Thus, the effect of a condition on
the immediacy of danger depends on what danger the statute
was designed to prevent, as well as on the remoteness of the
fulfillment of the condition, whether or not the condition is
within the speaker's control.
The Kelner court's holding that the threat must be uncondi"1 402 F.2d at 680; see Tuberville v. Savage, 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1669).
F.2d at 680 n.10; see United States v. Metzdorf, 252 F. 933, 938 (D. Mont.
1918).
112 402
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tional affords greater protection to speech than does an ad hoc
determination of the effect of a condition on the imminency of

danger. The requirement ensures that persons making conditional threats that entail
speculative danger will not be punished
13
under the statute.'
The court quoted with approval Professor Thomas Emerson's first amendment test that allows punishment of speech
when a communication has become "so interlocked with violent
conduct as to constitute for all practical purposes part of the
[proscribed] action."' 1 4 Professor Emerson's test, which the
Kelner court deemed consistent with its own standard, imposes a
rigorous imminency requirement. Professor Emerson's test was
developed in the incitement context and he believes that it is best
applied to "the urging of immediate, specific acts of violence."" 5
In rejecting the fighting words doctrine, however, the court may
have ruled out incitement of violent action as an evil contemplated by section 875(c). 1 6 Moreover, the circumstance for
which the Kelner court's test is best suited, the creation of emotional distress,' 7 is not well described by Professor Emerson's
test.
III.

CONCLUSION

In fashioning a test to identify "true threats" punishable
under section 875(c), the Second Circuit in Kelner failed to articulate what harms the statute was intended to prevent and to
evaluate fully how the interests of the statute could be vindicated
113 Judge Mulligan, concurring in Kelner, believed that the majority overemphasized
the need for immediacy of the threatened injury in its test for a "true threat." Judge
Mulligan suggested that even a conditional threat might be constitutionally punishable
under § 875(c):
For example, if the threat here had been made in the same setting but had
been phrased, "We plan to kill Arafat a week from today unless he pays us
$1,000,000," I would hold that the threat is still well within § 875(c) and not
protected under the First Amendment although the threatened homicide is not
immediate, imminent or unconditional under the test proposed by Judge
Oakes.
534 F.2d at 1029 (Mulligan, J., concurring). Judge Mulligan, however, may have been
correct for the wrong reasons in concluding that the threat he hypothesized would not
be protected under the first amendment. In his example, the threat did create an imminent danger that Arafat would be moved by fear to pay the demanded fee. The
relevant harm in the hypothetical was extortion. See generally note 47 supra.
14 534 F.2d at 1027 (quoting T. EMERsoN, supra note 87, at 329); see Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456-57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
115 T. EMERSON, supra note 87, at 328.
11
See text accompanying note 73 supra.
1 7
1 See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
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with the least intrusion on pure speech. As a result, the circuit
court's constitutional standard did not adequately accommodate
the purposes of section 875(c) with first amendment imperatives.
The Kelner decision leaves unanswered the question of what implications such traditional first amendment principles as the
fighting words doctrine and the clear and present danger test
have for the application of section 875(c). Additionally, the Kelner
court's reliance on cases construing section 871, especially Watts,
is unsettling not only because of the Kelner court's questionable
interpretation of what exactly was decided in Watts, but because
the court's uncritical borrowing of principles from section 871
cases is characteristic of its general failure to scrutinize the first
amendment problems particular to the statute and facts before
it.

